Instruments for effective global climate policy: the carbon deposit system by Huppes, G.
Instruments for Effective 
Global Climate Policy: 
the Carbon Deposit System
Gjalt Huppes
Presentation at the Symposium on the Occasion of 
the 65th Birthday of Gjalt Huppes
Symposium
Making Climate Policy a Global Reality: 
Instruments, Mechanisms, Consequences 
and Policy Process
 
Leiden, 16 December 2011
2Gjalt Huppes
Contents
Summary .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
WHY RECONSIDER CLIMATE POLICY INSTRUMENTATION? ............................................................................................. 5
Not enough and yet already too complex ............................................................................................................................. 5
Simplicity in global policy instrument design: how to get carbon priced? ......................................................................... 5
WHAT IS THE SIMPLEST, MOST EFFECTIVE AND OPTIMAL SOLUTION? ........................................................................ 7
Carbon substance flow analysis and carbon deposit ........................................................................................................... 7
Multi-country application: border issues ............................................................................................................................. 9
HOW TO IMPLEMENT THE CARBON DEPOSIT SYSTEM? .................................................................................................... 9
Nation states: capable administration .................................................................................................................................. 9
Border corrections with non-participating countries ......................................................................................................... 9
Border corrections with participating countries .................................................................................................................. 11
APPLICATION TO TWO GLOBAL BLOCS .................................................................................................................................. 13
Level of the deposit ................................................................................................................................................................ 13
The deposit system quantified: EU alone and OECD++........................................................................................................ 13
Tax proceeds from the successful deposit system ................................................................................................................. 15 
Level markets, innovation, and competitiveness .................................................................................................................. 17
COMPARING THE CARBON DEPOSIT WITH EMISSION TAX AND CAP-AND-TRADE .................................................. 19
Comparing on the basis of completeness ............................................................................................................................. 19
Comparing administrative requirements ............................................................................................................................. 19
Comparing potential optimality ........................................................................................................................................... 20 
Comparing political feasibility .............................................................................................................................................. 20
PROSPECTS ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
References ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 22
3Instruments for Effective Global Climate Policy: the Carbon Deposit system
Summary
Climate policy has been developed in many countries 
in the last decade using many different policy instruments. 
Often, over a dozen of them are applied for a given product 
or installation, including taxes, subsidies and all sorts of 
regulations. This proliferation of policy instruments has not 
halted the rise in CO
2
 concentrations in the atmosphere. 
Global emission trends are steadily increasing, and by 2010 
the rise had already recovered from the 2008 recession dip. 
A simpler, more comprehensive, and more powerful system 
needs to be developed to curb climate change, which implies 
substantial carbon pricing. One of the options is discussed 
in detail here, the carbon deposit. The principle is simple. A 
deposit is paid for any carbon entering a country, for instance 
by fossil fuel extraction or in imports, while a refund is paid 
for any carbon leaving the country in exports or by geological 
storage. Any carbon lost along the way, as CO
2
 emissions, 
is thereby implicitly charged for, to an amount equal to the 
deposit paid. The carbon deposit thus functions as an indirect 
CO
2 
emission tax, to be implemented at country level.
The implementation would be extremely simple at a global 
level, since it covers fossil fuel production and permanent 
storage only. In the case of implementation at national level, 
the border controls necessary to cover import and export 
flows may complicate the picture substantially, as very many 
products would have to be covered. International alignment 
can considerably simplify the implementation. If multiple 
countries join the system, they can function as a bloc, without 
product-level border controls between them. If the bloc covers 
the whole world, we are back at the simplest system. Though 
this is unlikely to happen, major countries like China, India, 
Indonesia, Russia and Brazil would be well able to join the 
system, unlike other global system options like cap-and-
trade based systems. Such systems set a cap on total allowable 
emissions per country, distributed over all facilities in that 
country. They also require measurement of the emissions of 
each facility and controls on the trade in emission permits.
The border controls between the bloc implementing the 
deposit and the non-deposit bloc remain a key issue, which 
must be resolved within the constraints of rules for open 
international trade. Essentially, two markets would be created, 
one with and one without carbon pricing. All products whose 
price includes a substantial share of deposit burden should be 
covered. Importers to the deposit bloc would not only have to 
pay for direct carbon content, but also for the indirect carbon 
emissions, which have gone unpriced in the non-deposit 
country. Refunding of the deposit for exports to non-deposit 
countries similarly should not only cover the direct carbon 
content but also the embodied carbon flows, as the deposit 
was paid for these emissions. Such border controls would not 
pose a serious problem for fossil energy carriers, as substantial 
taxes and regulations are already in place for most of them. 
Hence, there would be a substantial difference between “going 
it alone”, for example a bloc involving only the EU, with 
much external trade, and a near global system covering all 
industrialized and industrializing countries, with hardly any 
external trade. Border controls create a similar burden on 
deposit and tax systems, and are more tedious in cap-and-
trade systems due to the varying permit prices.
The administrative implementation of the deposit system 
constitutes much less of a problem than that of any other 
effective carbon pricing, as these require in-country firm-level 
controls. The carbon deposit system can be implemented 
by capable taxing organizations, which already exist, even 
in developing countries, for collecting indirect taxes, duties, 
excises, tariffs and the like. This is all that is required for the 
carbon deposit system. The proceeds of an effective carbon 
deposit system, rising to the order of €625 per ton in 2040, 
would be limited to around one and a half percent of GDP.
The carbon deposit system can be compared to similar 
broad carbon pricing systems, especially emission taxes and 
cap-and-trade systems like the Emissions Trading System 
(ETS) in the European Union. It is conceptually related to 
a uniform carbon tax, with the added feature of a refund 
for carbon capture and storage (CCS). Whereas national 
implementation of a uniform tax at emission sources is more 
vulnerable to political pressures, with possible exemptions and 
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slack controls, border corrections with non-aligned countries 
would be similar to the emission tax. 
National implementation of carbon emission taxes and 
cap-and-trade systems requires a very capable administrative 
organization to prevent emission fraud, with trading requiring 
further administrative capacities. Such capable administrations 
are not present in developing countries, nor even in several 
developed countries. The fixed price deposit system and fixed-
price carbon taxes could make border corrections easier, as 
permit prices for cap-and-trade systems are variable and hence 
the basis for border corrections is variable. The deposit system 
has an incentive structure which does not involve a common 
interest in creating a paper reality.
Overall, it seems that the deposit system offers advantages 
over carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems in its 
comprehensive applicability at national level, its nearly global 
applicability and its very much lower private transaction 
cost and public administrative burden, thus increasing its 
effectiveness and optimality.
FIGURES AND TABLES FOR THE SYMPOSIUM PRESENTATION BY GH
Figure 1.  Medium-term trends in CO2 emissions. Source: Olivier et al (2011) 
 
  
Figure 2.  Carbon flows through the economy of global society; outer boundaries only. 
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WHy rECONSIDEr CLImaTE POLICy 
INSTrumENTaTION?
Not enough and yet already too complex
As figure 1 shows, current climate policies have not been 
effective in curbing CO
2
 emissions (Olivier et al 2011). 
Emissions have been rising, and even at an accelerating 
rate, in the last decade. Climate policy has been taking 
shape for decades now, resulting in a substantial number 
of implemented policies. These policies have diverse and 
overlapping domains of application, ultimately forming a 
“tangled web” of overlapping instruments. One essential key to 
successful climate policy is to price carbon, either by means of 
economic instruments or indirectly by physical regulations, as 
an option of second choice. The principles have been accepted 
in the UN Kyoto Protocol and have been most extensively 
implemented in the EU ETS, the European emissions trading 
system. Together, these various climate policies have certainly 
had an impact, but not enough to substantially curb and 
reduce climate changing emissions. Global CO
2
 emissions 
are rising, only slightly delayed by incidental recessions, so 
concentrations are also rising, and the same is true for global 
temperature.
The limited effectiveness has both political and policy 
instrumentation causes. Increased competition in a globalizing 
economy constrains national policy efforts, as national 
industries will be hurt by effective unilateral actions. The 
applicability of the most comprehensive instrument available 
today, the EU ETS, is limited to less than 50% of EU emissions, 
with special exemptions for many industries to safeguard 
their international competitiveness. In addition, the post-
Kyoto process has come to a halt in Copenhagen, Cancun 
and Durban, with no new obligations and no new countries 
entering the trading system. In the US in particular, there 
is substantial debate on carbon taxes as an alternative to 
Kyoto-type cap-and-trade systems, with climate scientists like 
Nordhaus (2011) and Hansen (2009) arguing against cap-
and-trade. Both proponents of carbon taxes and of cap-and-
trade systems agree on one point: without substantial carbon 
pricing, effective climate policy will remain an illusion.
Simplicity in global policy instrument design: how to get 
carbon priced?
Simplicity requires one carbon price for any emission from any 
source, anywhere. This clearly relates to optimality. Leaving out 
some sources or covering them twice or three times will raise 
the cost of equally effective policy. For reasons of optimality, 
the carbon price should also be predictable in the long run. 
Carbon pricing would reduce the need for most of the current 
policy instruments, at least in all domains where markets are 
functioning reasonably well. Of course this is true only if the 
carbon price becomes high enough to reach a long-term goal 
like “80% emission reduction by 2050”. 
There are already many policies in place that focus on 
market activities. An example is that of the policies relating 
to the supply and demand chain across the electricity sector, 
involving several renewables policies in terms of subsidies 
and physical regulations, supply chain regulations on 
investment decisions, technical requirements on electricity 
production facilities, and energy taxes and price regulations, 
which differentiate between final users. Most of these could 
be replaced by carbon pricing at a level required to meet the 
goals behind all these policies, not only climate goals but 
also security of supply goals. One approach to achieve such 
simplification is the cap-and-trade system in place in the EU, 
in the form of the ETS (European Emissions Trading System) 
which is currently in a start-up phase, moving towards full 
auctioning of the ETS permits. Its implementation requires 
measuring emissions at the level of firms and plants or 
installations. Although the ETS has had a number of start-up 
problems, it is now by far the most comprehensive climate 
policy system operational. However, it faces three major 
challenges: 
·	 broadening its range of application to all or nearly all 
emission sources, compared to less than 50% now;
·	 stabilizing its permit prices on a long-term rising 
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curve, so as to attract the necessary research and 
development and investments;
·	 having most other countries join the system. 
Broader coverage by cap-and-trade systems requires 
including diffuse sources. This may be possible only by having 
more upstream measurements and indirect emission permits, 
which may easily result in gaps and overlap. Price stability in 
permit markets might be obtained, for instance, by adapting 
the number of permits so as to reach a predetermined price 
level, leaving the fixed cap at least for the time being, or by 
combining with adjustable taxing systems. More elaborate 
proposals have been developed as by McKibbin (2007).
Combining such elements would go very much in the 
direction of an emission tax administered upstream, for 
example applied to the producers of the fuels used in a heating 
installation, which is only one step away from a third system, 
besides cap-and-trade and emission tax, which we call the 
carbon deposit. In this sense, the three carbon pricing systems 
are close enough to gradually transform into one another.
The third challenge is that of broader international 
participation, which is necessary for global effectiveness 
and for avoiding unjustified international inequalities in 
competitiveness. One obstacle for major developing countries 
which might like to join the cap-and-trade system is that they 
currently lack the capacity for reliable implementation, and it 
is uncertain whether they will be able to build it up in the next 
decades. 
The ETS-type cap-and-trade system (assuming full 
auctioning of the permits) and the emission tax system 
will remain the major references for comparison in this 
paper, which ends with a look at the prospects. With any 
comprehensive, stable system, a simultaneous step would be to 
reduce, rearrange and simplify the web of policy instruments 
which is currently in place and is still rapidly developing. 
WHaT IS THE SImPLEST, mOST EFFECTIVE aND 
OPTImaL SOLuTION?
Carbon substance flow analysis and carbon deposit
The first step toward simplification is to examine the carbon 
flows at a highly aggregated level, in a Substance Flow diagram 
for the world like that shown in figure 2. It depicts the inflows 
and outflows of carbon in the economy, using a basic tool 
of industrial ecology called SFA (SFA/MFA, Substance Flow/
Material Flow Analysis). For a stable atom like carbon, mass 
conservation implies that what comes in accumulates or goes 
out. As fossil fuels hardly accumulate over the years, carbon 
in equals carbon out, as depicted in figure 2. The principles of 
instrument development are simple as well. Carbon emissions 
have to be uniformly priced, and the polluter has to pay. A key 
problem with CO
2
 is that it is almost impossible to use direct 
emissions measurements that are precise enough for taxing 
purposes. 
The core feature of the instrument proposed here, the 
carbon deposit, is indirect emission measurement using SFA, 
not per facility or installation, firm or consumer, but for the 
world economy as a whole, as if we had a one country world 
(see figure 3). Fossil carbon that is extracted and enters the 
economy would be paid for, while a refund would be paid upon 
delivery of carbon back to geology, stored for a geological period 
of time. All carbon lost in between would not get a refund 
and is therefore paid for. A further simplification is to leave 
out the CO
2
 extractions from the air through photosynthesis. 
Bioproducts like food mostly have a short cycle and do not 
have a net influence on CO
2
 emissions, unless they are taken 
out of their short-term dynamics by putting them in geological 
storage. Most importantly from an instrument point of view, 
they cannot be measured precisely enough for taxing, deposit or 
permitting purposes. They would be disregarded at the inflow 
side but are included in refunds for permanent storage, creating 
a clear incentive for replacing fossil energy by bio-energy. 
In an administrative sense, the system is extremely simple. 
The only actors involved in the instrument would be the 
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Figure 4.  Carbon deposit in a country trading with a non‐deposit country. 
Figure 3. Carbon deposit in a One Country World. 
  
Figure 4.  Carbon deposit in a country trading with a non‐deposit country. 
9Instruments for Effective Global Climate Policy: the Carbon Deposit system
producers of fossil fuels and those bringing carbon back to 
geology, usually referred to as Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) but here referring to the storage activity only. 
The result is very similar to what we are accustomed to 
as consumers: a deposit, which is why we call it the carbon 
deposit, as one application of the substance deposit as 
described by Huppes et al (1987).
Multi-country application: border issues
The above description was based on a one country world. 
However, we do not have a one country world. The system 
would have to be implemented at country level, for all sorts of 
political reasons and to ensure effective implementation. Once 
again, we have to set uniform and comprehensive indirect 
measurement boundaries, but not for the world as a whole 
but coinciding with the geographic boundaries of policy 
implementation: the nation states. Indirect measurement 
of emissions is not only based on carbon inflow from fossil 
resources but also on carbon imports in products, and on 
outflows not only in the form of geological carbon storage 
but also of exports in products. Again, whatever is lost “in 
between” is emitted. This measurement design can be made to 
correspond directly to the policy instrument: payment of an 
excise, duty or tax on an inflow of carbon, that is, a deposit, 
with a repayment upon carbon storage or export, that is, the 
deposit refund. If one country introduces the deposit system, 
its trade with another country becomes part of the instrument 
implementation (see figure 4). Such a carbon deposit system 
would create an economic driver for emission reduction in the 
countries introducing it.
HOW TO ImPLEmENT THE CarBON DEPOSIT SySTEm?
Nation states: capable administration
In our world, which is based on nation states, implementation 
is not “by the world” but by country level administrations. 
If the world were one country, life would be simple, as there 
would not be any imports or exports. The carbon deposit 
system would then be levied on fossil fuels only, and repaid 
when any carbon is stored “forever”, for instance through 
storage in deep saline aquifers.  However, there are many 
countries in the world, and several of them would presumably 
join in the carbon deposit system while several would not. 
Those joining the system would have a relatively simple 
agreement to make, to implement the same level of carbon 
deposit. No other obligations, such as caps per country 
specified in time, would be required. This would allow for 
free trade, free from deposit refund and payment, between 
countries joining the system.  Thus, imports and exports 
would be treated differently if they take place within the 
bloc of participating countries (see figure 5) as opposed to 
transactions involving non-participating countries (see figure 
4). Trade with non-participating countries would require 
border adjustment per product.
Border corrections with non-participating countries
The relation with non-participating countries would be 
based on border corrections, with deposit paid by importers 
to the authorities of the importing country and refunded 
to exporters by that country upon export of carbon in their 
products. Let us first have a look at exports from the country 
participating in the deposit system, for which some further 
refinement is needed. The refund is paid for the carbon in 
each product. For carbon emissions in the deposit country, 
however, the deposit functions implicitly as an emission tax, 
as no refund can be given for emitted carbon (as CO
2
). For 
these embodied emissions there thus needs to be a refund 
upon export as well, refunding the deposit that had already 
been paid on that carbon. Hence, upon export of a product 
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Figure 5.  Carbon deposit in a bloc of aligned countries. 
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from the participating country, the exporter gets a refund on 
embodied carbon, as the sum of the carbon in the product plus 
its upstream CO
2
 emissions. On the imports side, the deposit is 
similarly charged on carbon in products, including fuels, and 
on embodied CO
2 
emissions, as no deposit has yet been paid. 
These border corrections would create two level playing 
fields. One is in the deposit bloc, where prices are higher as 
they include a deposit component, but where other taxes are 
lower. The other is in the non-deposit bloc. Firms from any 
bloc can operate in both blocs without distorted competition. 
In the deposit system as proposed here, there is only 
compensation for the relatively easily determined transfer 
costs, based on embodied carbon. In addition to the returning 
of these transfer payments, there are the real costs that firms 
incur for the behavioral changes for emission reduction 
induced by the deposit system. Increases in real cost induced 
by the deposit system (or any other effective system) would be 
extremely difficult to determine. This is true especially in the 
longer term, as the additional costs have to be compared with 
a virtual situation without climate policy or with a different 
climate policy. In a comprehensive global system, only one 
technology would tend to emerge, so these costs would be very 
small. A stepwise policy implementation, based for example on 
4% steps over a period of 25 years, would mean that the cost 
differences in the first years would be very small anyway.
The border controls with non-deposit countries would 
constitute a major administrative burden on the system. Most 
countries, including developing ones, have the capacity to 
tax primary production and put tariffs on imports, and are 
similarly capable of refunding upon export and controlled 
storage. But the number of products involved is very large 
if a substantial number of countries do not join, and the 
computation of embodied carbon per product is somewhat 
tedious. 
Border corrections with participating countries
The product flows between participating countries would be 
on the same level playing field. From an economic optimality 
point of view, there is therefore is no reason to have any 
border corrections at import or export. For the firms involved 
in intra-bloc trade, no border controls or registrations are 
required and no deposit payment or refund is involved. 
However, the question may then arise to which country 
the proceeds of deposit levying would accrue. An uneven 
situation may occur, for instance, when bulk imports from 
non-deposit countries with high carbon content are entering 
through a transit country, and similarly for exports. The basis 
for the distribution of net proceeds in the bloc would be the 
location of emissions, as it would also be if an equivalent 
emission tax had been implemented or a comprehensive 
cap-and-trade system existed (which is not possible for both 
these instruments). For countries as a whole, the emission 
volume is a figure easily established, for instance based on UN-
standardized emission inventories. No supranational bodies 
are needed for this task. The administrative burden of this 
corrective payment between governments is extremely limited. 
The bloc functions as one unit for the deposit system based 
climate policy, with outside borders only.
If no corrective payment between countries takes place, the 
deposit system starts to function as a resource tax. 
12
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Figure 6. Scenario 1 Global Policy Failure: Carbon flows for EU27 and Rest of the World, 
2030. Source: see table 1. 
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APPlICAtIoN to two GloBAl BloCS
level of the deposit
There would be two basic approaches to setting a level for 
the deposit, similar to that for an emission tax. One is to set 
the level equal to the environmental damage caused by an 
additional unit of emission (the Pigouvian tax). The other 
is to set the level high enough to reach an agreed target (the 
Baumol tax). Damage levels are widely disputed. The best-
known proposal, in the Stern Review (2006), is regarded as 
unacceptably high by traditional mainstream economists; see 
the survey by Tol (2008). Within the mainstream, however, 
there is serious debate over the irrelevance of the traditional 
outcomes, a debate opened by Weitzman (2009). This 
irrelevance is due to the low-chance high-impact outcomes of 
climate change. Runaway effects of climate change, which is the 
fat tail in the probability distribution of outcomes, may lead to 
a disaster with possibly billions of victims. Such effects are not 
amenable to traditional economic analysis. 
Establishing the tax so as to reach a predefined target is also 
hard to achieve, as modeling the far-reaching innovations 
required for substantial emission reductions is extremely 
difficult. We just do not know if there will be a breakthrough 
in photovoltaics, geothermal energy or carbon capture and 
storage. Nor do we know how far the end users will go in 
reducing their energy demand. 
It is clear, however, that substantial change is required 
and that emissions from fossil fuels will have to be reduced by 
at least 80% by 2050 and by a higher percentage if we delay 
emission reductions any further. Both lines of argumentation 
have been followed in the Stern report, leading to a carbon 
price of the order of €300.
As the introduction of the deposit system would be done 
in small steps, we would have gone through many innovations 
and learning curves well before the full level is reached. If there 
is a real danger by then of overshooting the mark, the increase 
to full level can be postponed. This danger, though real, is not 
a serious risk and should also be considered in relation to the 
reduction of all other greenhouse gases. Non-fossil energy 
sources will have been substantially developed by then, easing 
the pain of further reduction of fossil fuel use. In cap-and-
trade systems, the cap per year might be set based on similar 
reasoning, to an annually decreasing level that would lead to 
predictable, slowly rising permit prices. The expected price 
rises would induce innovation in the cap-and-trade system, 
then similar to the predetermined increases in the deposit or 
emission tax system. 
A practical perspective on setting the ultimate level of the 
deposit might be to take current duties and excises on fuels as a 
reference. Current average levels of gasoline taxes in the OECD 
are of the order of 50 Eurocents per liter, mostly much lower 
in the US and much higher in the EU and Japan. This is the 
equivalent of €625 per ton of carbon, roughly twice as high as 
Stern proposed (Stern 2006). We will use this ultimate deposit 
level as a reference in the quantifications. 
To avoid unnecessary short-term costs of transition, a gradual 
introduction can reduce these short-term costs. We assume 
a 25-year build-up to the full level, in four percentage point 
increases per year. As long-term decisions are influenced by 
expectations about long-term prices, the predictability of the 
longer-term deposit levels is a key condition for dynamically 
achieving the lowest costs of transition to a low-carbon society. 
If we optimistically assume that the carbon deposit can be 
started in 2015, the full deposit level would be reached in 2040, 
in steps of €25 per ton per year. 
the deposit system quantified: EU alone and OECD++
The quantification of course depends on the year that is 
chosen. Let us take a year somewhere in the mid-term of 
the transition, with a deposit level of €300 per ton carbon, 
around the year 2030. We use this mid-term year as modeling 
toward the final year is extremely difficult. The deposit system 
would start to reduce carbon emissions by 2030, but not yet 
substantially, as major redirections in the technologies of 
supply and demand will require one to two decades before 
substantial application can start. By 2030, global GDP and 
14
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 Figure 7.  Scenario 2 Global Policy Success: Carbon flows for OECD++ and “OPEC”, 2030. 
Source: see Table 2. 
 
 
 
  
Figure 8. Scenario 2 Global Policy Success: Money flows of OECD++ and “OPEC”, 2030. 
Source: see Table 2. 
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global population will have risen, assuming that longer-term 
trends hold. The trade flows between countries will also 
increase, more so than global GDP increases. We now depict 
two scenarios regarding global climate policy. One is where 
the international policy process breaks down and the EU goes 
it alone. This is the global Policy Failure Scenario. The deposit 
bloc in this scenario consists only of the EU 27 countries. It 
has very substantial trade with non-participating countries, 
rising to around 15% of EU GDP. We enter reasonable figures 
for GDPs and trade flows, and calculate carbon flows and 
the resulting deposit levels. The second scenario is Global 
Policy Success, depicting a highly successful international 
climate policy, with all industrializing and industrialized 
countries joining the deposit system and only a bloc like OPEC 
remaining outside the system. The external trade would then 
be very limited, and would involve a number of fossil products 
and the imports to “OPEC” financed with the proceeds of their 
fossil exports.  
In the EU alone scenario, the emissions of the rest of the 
world would continue along the rising trend of CO
2
 emissions 
of the last decades, by 1.9% a year. In fact, this seems a low 
estimate, as this excludes the EU, one of the regions that 
have already shown slower emissions growth in the past. 
EU emissions would decrease, we assume, by around 20% 
in 2030. Higher decreases would be achieved in later years, 
as technology and investments would be geared to lower 
emissions, a development which starts as soon as the scheme 
becomes convincing. A survey of the data is presented in table 
1, with deposit-relevant flows depicted in figure 6. Even if the 
EU were to reduce its direct emissions by 20%, which would 
be really fast, the emissions due to EU consumption would 
rise substantially, by nearly 50%. This is due to the assumed 
economic growth in the EU and to the rising share of “dirty” 
imports, not compensated by the cleaner ticket of EU exports. 
Global emissions would rise by around a third. We can thus 
rightfully call this scenario the Global Policy Failure scenario.
In the second scenario, all industrializing and 
industrialized countries (i.e. the OECD++ countries) join the 
deposit system, using climate policy also for taxing purposes. 
We assume that only OPEC would stay outside the system, 
although with a near global coverage of climate policy, there 
would be clear incentives for them to join as well. Even if they 
do not, however, their share in global GDP would already 
be limited and would be further reduced due to oil prices 
dropping as a result of substantially reduced demand. We 
assume that OPEC would keep production at the current level, 
but at somewhat lower prices. With nearly global coverage of 
the deposit system, the rising trend in CO
2
 emissions would be 
reversed, with emissions reduction by 2030 also assumed to be 
of the order of 20%. For the world as a whole, the emissions 
due to consumption would also drop by 20% in 2030, with 
faster reductions occurring in the subsequent decades.  This 
is why this second scenario can be called the Global Policy 
Success scenario.
tax proceeds from the successful deposit system
The carbon deposit system would create net proceeds for 
governments, as would carbon taxes and auctioned permits. 
What governments would do with such proceeds is up to 
them. They may use them to reduce budget deficits or taxes, 
or they may spend more, on whatever outlays they deem most 
useful, including transfer payments to less developed countries 
or poorer parts of their population. How large the proceeds 
would be depends on the level of the deposit and the amount 
of carbon entering and leaving the economy. Assuming a 
level of the deposit by 2030 of around €300 per ton of carbon 
allows the proceeds for the world to be specified. Per-country 
proceeds would differ, depending on the emission intensity 
of their economy. For the world as a whole, they would be of 
the order of 1.5% of GDP, thus constituting a few percent of 
total tax proceeds, an interesting option. For the EU, with its 
lower carbon intensity to begin with, the proceeds would be 
somewhat lower, at 1.2%, the same as if the EU should go it 
alone.
16
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Table 1 
Table 1   GDP and  Trade and Carbon Flows in and between two blocs: 
Scenario 1 Global Policy Failure:  EU27 and RoW  in 2010 and 2030.
Year 2010
GDP 12257 B€
Trade 1400 B€, I& E averaged
Trade share in GDP 11,4%
Embodied C in imports 982 rough estimate, fossil carbon + upstream C emissions
Embodied C  in exports 218 rough estimate, fossil carbon + upstream C emissions
Primary fossil C EU 335 Mton EU net fossil imports:  783
Primary fossil C RoW 7795 Mton Upstream emissions imports 199
Carbon emissions EU 1118 Mton Emissions for exports 218
Carbon emissions RoW 7012 Mton
Carbon emissions total 8130 Mton
C emissions EU consumption 1099
Year 2030
Trade share  15% Assumed
Trade  3309 B€
GDP 3%pa 22063 B€, +80% over 20 years
Trade rise relative to 2010 236%
Embodied C in imports 1434 Mton up ~ emission increase
Embodied C in exports 174 Mton down ~ emission reduction
Primary fossil C EU 335 Mton EU net fossil imports:  559
Primary fossil C RoW 10776 Mton Upstream emissions imports 874
Carbon emission EU 894 Mton minus 20%, assumed Emissions for exports 174
Carbon emissions RoW 10216 Mton Trend 1.9%, growth total 46%
Carbon emissions total 11111 Mton
C emissions EU consumption 1594
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The money flows involved in deposit payment and 
refunding for imports and exports with OPEC would be highly 
asymmetric. The deposit paid on oil and gas imports would be 
of the order of half a trillion Euros, while refunding on exports 
would be of the order of 25 billion Euros. Rent incomes in 
these oil producing countries would fall substantially.
level markets, innovation, and competitiveness 
Large-scale application of the deposit system would remove 
most competition issues with non-participating countries. 
Although they may have a certain advantage now when 
exporting their products to the deposit bloc, a slow build-up 
of the deposit level would mean that this advantage might 
become substantial only decades from now. By then, their 
technologies would lag greatly behind. This would not give 
them a chance to really compete, as technologies in the deposit 
bloc would have developed by then reckoning with prices as 
changed by the deposit system.
Comprehensive carbon pricing with a predictable long-
term price development is the policy instrument most 
conducive to focused innovation. As regards competitiveness 
within the deposit bloc, there is no reason to assume that 
one country would be unduly favored over another by the 
carbon deposit system. Other factors would be determining 
their performance, such as the quality of education and 
research, and entrepreneurial excellence. Countries can create 
institutions to foster innovation and competitiveness, and the 
most successful countries would become the most affluent 
ones. Successful climate policy will not alter that.
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Table 2 
Table 2.   GDP and  Trade and Carbon Flows in and between two blocs: 
Scenario 2 Global Policy Success: OECD++ and OPEC, 2010 and 2030 .
Year 2010
GDP OECD++ 60720 B€
GDP OPEC 2324 B€  share: 3,7%
Trade 1014 B€, exports
Trade share in GDP 1,7%
Embodied C in imports 1490 rough estimate, fossil carbon + upstream C emissions
Embodied C  in exports 100 rough estimate, fossil carbon + upstream C emissions
Primary fossil C OECD+ 6510 Mton OECD++ net fossil imports  1350
Primary fossil C OPEC 1620 Mton Upstream emissions imports 140
Carbon emissions OECD 7860 Mton Emissions for exports 100
Carbon emissions OPEC 270 Mton
Carbon emissions total 8130 Mton OPEC exports 29 Million Barrels per day
C emissions OECD++ consumption 7900 Mton
Year 2030
Trade share  0,5% Assumed as oil prices down, volume equal
Trade  668 B€
GDP 4%pa 133584 B€, +120% over 20 years
Trade decrease relative to 2010 34%
Embodied C in imports 1490 Mton up ~ emission increase
Embodied C in exports 80 Mton down ~ emission reduction
Primary fossil C OECD++ 4938 Mton OECD++ net fossil imports 1350
Primary fossil C OPEC 1620 Mton Upstream emissions imports 140
Carbon emission OECD++ 6288 Mton minus 20%, assumed Emissions for exports 80
Carbon emissions OPEC 270 Mton Remains equal
Carbon emissions total 6558 Mton
C emissions OECD++ consumption 6348 Mton
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COmParING THE CarBON DEPOSIT WITH EmISSION 
TaX aND CaP-aND-TraDE 
Judgment on any policy instrument is not just absolute but 
also relative to other options. There are a number of key 
issues in the carbon deposit implementation which have their 
counterparts in any other instrument for effective climate 
policy. These issues are the system boundary in terms of the 
completeness of flows covered; administrative implementation; 
and the optimality of induced emission reductions. After 
comparing the three instruments, the section ends by 
examining political feasibility, with a look at post-Kyoto 
options. 
Comparing on the basis of completeness
System boundaries are clear in geographical terms, and are also 
clear in terms of fossil carbon extracted, though some debate 
is possible on what constitutes permanent storage, as with CO
2 
in clathrates in the deep sea. The deposit system is unique in its 
fully indirect measurement, covering any emission from fossil 
sources. Source-oriented emission taxes and cap-and-trade 
systems would only be able to cover part of these emissions 
and may easily lead to overlapping implementations, as in fuels 
taxed and then used in installations which are taxed directly as 
well. 
Other system boundaries are more open, as in CO
2
 from 
other sources than fossil fuels. Around 5% of CO
2
 emissions 
result from carbon carbonate reduced for cement production. 
Also, CO
2
 is a major greenhouse gas but not the only one. 
Those emissions that are not included will require other 
policies.  Such issues are very similar for emission tax and 
cap-and-trade systems. Carbon taken from the atmosphere by 
current photosynthesis is disregarded in the deposit system, 
as described above. Some of these flows are included in the 
emission computations by the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), and also function in the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), but are problematic there. 
Other, mostly non-carbon pricing policy instruments will be 
required in climate policy to reduce emissions from biomass 
production and other natural sources, also covering non-CO
2
 
emissions like methane and nitrous oxide.
Overall completeness for CO
2
 is one characteristic in which 
the carbon deposit system is clearly superior to emission taxes 
and cap-and-trade systems.
Comparing administrative requirements
Administrative implementation of the carbon deposit 
system would be very similar to that for alcohol excises, 
implemented by stable organizations with a very long tradition 
in most countries, including most developing countries. The 
procedures at import and export differ between countries but 
may easily be set up in a uniform way for the carbon deposit 
system. The administration of primary production and border 
controls on fossils are almost in place already, for current tax 
and royalty purposes. Such administrative procedures are 
incomparably simpler than those for source-oriented emission 
tax and cap-and-trade systems, which have some intermediate 
boundary for measurement within the economy. Both national 
and international carbon trading would be fully avoided in 
the deposit system. Since even administratively advanced 
developing countries like China and India do not have the 
capacity to effectively implement a cap-and-trade system in the 
next decades, this is a clear advantage of the deposit system. 
One key issue for all effective carbon-pricing policies is 
that of border corrections with non-policy countries. The 
carbon deposit system, as well as the carbon tax system, would 
have a well-defined quantitative specification as a clear basis 
for border corrections. The inherently unstable price of carbon 
permits would make such corrections more problematic in 
cap-and-trade systems.
Overall, the administrative burden of the carbon deposit 
system and the transaction costs induced broader in society 
would be substantially lower for a deposit system than for an 
emission tax system, and very substantially lower than for a 
cap-and-trade system.
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Comparing potential optimality
Optimality is based on comprehensive implementation of 
an equal market correction for any emissions, at long-term 
predictable levels. In the electricity chain, the emerging web 
of overlapping policy instruments already comprises a few 
dozen instruments, including several types of subsidies, 
tax reductions, feed-in tariffs, emission taxes and tradable 
permits, and many non-economic regulations. Most of these 
could be replaced by the carbon deposit system, improving 
both effectiveness and optimality. As compared to taxes and 
cap-and-trade systems, the superior optimality results from 
wider coverage, and as compared to cap-and-trade from the 
stable predictable price level. Optimality from a supranational 
point of view results from broad global applicability, both 
in an administrative sense, since many countries are unable 
to join a cap-and-trade system, and from a longer-term 
political perspective, as discussed below. Optimality is also 
based on a long-term stable expected carbon price, which is 
best safeguarded by an international agreement on long-term 
evolution of the carbon deposit level. Such stable expectations 
are difficult to realize in cap-and-trade systems, as there will 
always be substantial price fluctuations due to unstable global 
and regional economic developments. There will also be 
unpredictable and possibly substantial transfers of income 
between countries due to their uneven economic development, 
the fast growing ones, mainly developing countries, having to 
buy permits from the slower growing ones. 
Overall, the deposit system could achieve the intended 
emission reductions at lower costs than either of the other 
systems.
Comparing political feasibility
Political feasibility is very much related to conditions for 
optimality, as equal treatment is a condition for acceptability to 
different stakeholders. The first issue is that the administrative 
capacity for cap-and-trade implementation seems lacking in 
developing countries, at least in China and India. Also, the 
more clientelistic types of governance in some developed 
countries will lead to difficulties in implementing cap-and-
trade systems, as their policy implementation is based on 
special treatment of interest groups. By contrast, all countries, 
including developing ones, have well-established traditions 
in implementing indirect taxes like charges and tariffs on 
products, which would be the only capacity required for 
implementing the deposit system. 
Special treatment always remains possible of course, for 
instance through subsidies. The comprehensive and equal 
deposit system, however, has no connection to special interests, 
which would make the subsidies very visible. With sectoral 
application as in cap-and-trade, the boundaries are never fully 
clear, and political string-pulling remains an attractive option 
for special interests.
At an international level, the overall advantage of the 
carbon deposit system in terms of political feasibility would 
result from the low level of international political commitment 
required, and at a national level from the inherently equal 
nature of its application.
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PrOSPECTS
Although a balanced judgment of the deposit system is not 
fully possible at this stage of conceptual development, it 
seems that economic optimality would be better served by 
this system, in view of its more general and equal coverage 
and its stronger basis for border corrections. And in terms 
of administrative implementation, the deposit system has 
the advantages of being simpler and also being feasible for 
developing countries. All countries need tax proceeds, with 
emerging countries having to create a broader tax basis 
anyway, and several rich countries having to compensate their 
deficits. Finally, after the introduction of the deposit system 
has started with a substantial core group, countries could join 
on the well-founded expectation that almost all would join 
the same system, and that their future economic development 
would not be hampered in unforeseen ways.  
The global feasibility of the system depends very much 
on the way the post-Kyoto debate develops. A situation in 
which all countries join the cap-and-trade system seems highly 
improbable. If there is a complete breakdown in the post-
Kyoto process, an entirely new system will be needed, like the 
carbon deposit system. Reality, however, will be somewhere in 
between, making the question one of evolution. The carbon 
deposit system might, for example, function side-by-side with 
a bloc of countries with cap-and-trade installed, especially 
if permit prices and deposit levels are aligned. Or the cap-
and-trade system might evolve in the direction of upstream 
measurement which, combined with a stabilized permit price, 
would turn it into something very similar to the deposit 
system. The deposit system could then supply conceptual 
guidance to such an evolutionary process. Such strategic 
considerations are, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
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